Emil Aslan Souleimanov

Emil Aslan (Souleimanov) is associate professor at the Department of Security Studies, Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Science Charles University. He is a graduate of Charles University (M.A. in International Relations in 2001 and Ph.D. in International Relations in 2005) and Peter the Great Saint Petersburg State Polytechnic University (LL.M. in 2004). His interest is in the theory and practice of irregular and asymmetric conflict, namely in (counter)insurgency, (counter)terrorism, and civil war, with focus on the micro-dynamic of violence and radicalization. An expert on the political ethnography of armed conflict, he has conducted extensive fieldwork in the midst of Europe’s Muslim diaspora communnities; among eyewitnesses of civil wars and former insurgents, as well as among members of Salafi groups. His current work looks into how socio-cultural factors, neglected in the extant research on civil wars and insurgencies, shape the social fabric of violence, most importantly, violent mobilization and pro-insurgent support.

Related resources

What is (not) asymmetric conflict? From conceptual stretching to conceptual structuring

Research 4/11/2019 View more

In the second half of the 1990s, the label “asymmetric” conflict rose to prominence among scholars and strategists, as a term for capturing the rising challenge that violent non-state actors posed to the liberal world order. However, the concept soon became a catch-phrase for a range of disparate phenomena, and other buzzwords arose to describe the threats of concern to decision-makers. Conceptual confusion beset the field. This article dissects the notion of asymmetric conflicts, and distinguishes between asymmetries involving differences in (1) status, (2) capabilities, or (3) strategies between belligerents. It argues that “asymmetric” conflicts can take numerous forms depending on the combination of differences present, and offers a blue-print for keeping track of the meaning of this concept in the hope of bringing greater precision to future debates.

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Ideology and Disengagement: A Case Study of Nationalists and Islamists in Chechnya

News 29/10/2018 View more

Disengagement from militant groups has often been related to individual level explanations like battle fatigue or desire to re-join family and friends. We seek to empirically examine which other factors, beyond individual level determinants, influenced disengagement processes among militants belonging to different types of Chechen militant organisations.

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Ideology and Disengagement: A Case Study of Nationalists and Islamists in Chechnya

Research 29/10/2018 View more

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Frankenstein in Grozny: vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov’s rule

Research 28/7/2018 View more

Many scholars have suggested that organized violence in Chechnya has ended, and that Russia’s Chechenization policy and Ramzan Kadyrov’s presidency deserve the credit. We suggest that Putin has created a Frankenstein-like ruler over whom he risks losing control. As a result, the conflict only appears resolved, and we draw attention to both vertical and horizontal cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov’s rule that could lead to renewed violence. Vertically, the Chechen strongman and his growing clout in regional and federal politics have antagonized Russian siloviki. Horizontally, thousands of Chechens appear to be in a state of postponed blood feud toward Kadyrov, his clan, and the kadyrovtsy, his personal army. Backed by President Putin’s personal support, Kadyrov has put in motion a brutal machine of persecution over which some signs indicate he has lost control. Fear of extermination at the hands of the Kadyrov and his personal army has kept most prospective avengers at a bay. Once President Putin’s support wanes, locals will retaliate against Kadyrov and against Russian troops stationed in the republic, and Russian law enforcement circles will openly challenge Kadyrov’s rule. Putin’s support is only likely to wither if the costs of continued support (which grow with Kadyrov’s increasing independence) exceed the benefits (derived from an enforced peace). Either a renewed insurgency or ever more recalcitrant behavior would demonstrate a level of interest misalignment that could induce Putin to withdraw his support. Such a turn of events would render these horizontal and vertical cracks in the foundation of Kadyrov’s rule more noticeable and would likely to cause the frozen conflict in Chechnya to thaw, leading to a new civil war.

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